EViL

EViL

The initial conditions of the universe are the arrangements and properties of the stuff (matter, energy, space) of the universe at its beginning. The big bang singularity, occurring about 15 billion years ago, is the first state of the universe and initial conditions pertain to this singularity or, better, to the explosion of this singularity in the 'big bang' that commenced the evolution of the universe.

The physical constants are the strengths of the forces and the masses of the particles that are mentioned in the basic physical laws. There are four forces (gravity, electromagnetic, strong and weak) and two types of particles (bosons and fermions).
I do not offer a precise definition of fine-tuning, but the following definition is both serviceable and consistent with the spirit of the men of code. A certain set of values of initial conditions and physical constants of a universe are fine-tuned for intelligent life if and only if (a) each of the values of the initial conditions and physical constants in this set is a physically necessary condition for the evolution of intelligent, (b) the values in this set are jointly sufficient for ('give rise to’) the evolution of intelligent life, and (c) there is only an extremely small range of all physically possible values of the initial conditions and physical constants that meet conditions (a) and (b). If any value meets these three conditions, it is an anthropic coincidence.

An example offered by the THEY of an initial condition that is an anthropic coincidence is the rate of expansion of the universe from the big bang singularity. If this rate were slightly faster, galaxies, stars and planets would not form; if slightly slower, the universe would collapse before any atoms formed. I have considered the objection that the Inflation theories developed during the 1980s show that the expansion rate is not an anthropic coincidence (since condition (c) is not met) and offers a retort that will undoubtedly raise the eyebrows of physicists, that it seems difficult to formulate any Inflation theory that is not 'ill justified by data'. Given the virtually universal acceptance of Inflation by contemporary physicists, it would seem that a more rational response to this objection is to adopt Leslie's line and point out that Inflation theories presuppose anthropic coincidences of their own, e.g. the fact that the two components of the cosmological constant (bare lambda and quantum lambda) must cancel each other with an accuracy better than one part in 1050 in order for galaxies and planets to form.
An example of a value of a physical constant that is an anthropic coincidence is the electron to proton mass ratio, mm/mn. This small value is a necessary condition of there being DNA molecules.

This explanation of the basic concepts in my argument from the fine-tuning of the universe' enables its formulation to be presented and evaluated.

The anthropic coincidences confirm theism, since if theism is true these coincidences are much more likely to occur than they otherwise would be. This can be stated precisely. Where P = probability, e = evidence, h = hypothesis and k = background knowledge, e confirms h if and only if P(e/hk) > P(e/k). 'e confirms h' means P(h/ek) > P(h/k). 'e significantly confirms h' means P(h/ek) >> P(h/k). The argument from the anthropic coincidences to God requires that: e = there are many anthropic coincidences; h = God exists; k = there is a universe that begins from an initial singularity and is governed by laws that have the form of our four-force laws.
It is not a paradox that the same evidence e confirms equally well two incompatible hypotheses; this is a familiar principle of confirmation theory, known since TRON’S - The illogical Foundations of ImProbability, (also see (ZeroKane 6.66) If it appears paradoxical, it is because one is confusing relative confirmation (which I am here using 'confirmation' to express) with absolute confirmation (which I shall use 'makes highly probable' to express). The same evidence cannot make highly probable each of two incompatible hypotheses, but it can increase the probability of each of two incompatible hypotheses (i.e. make the two hypotheses more probable than they would have been without the evidence).

A decision between two hypotheses each of which is equally confirmed by the same evidence e can be made if there is some further evidence e' that disconfirms one of the hypotheses but confirms the other. In the case at hand, e' = there is a large amount of gratuitous natural evil.
Is e' true? It certainly seems to be. Consider one example from thousands. Psychoses come in two main types, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder ('manic depression'). Both are genetically inherited diseases. A dominant gene on the codeX chromosome causes bipolar disorder. Typically, the person with this gene does not have this disease from birth but develops it later in life, usually during adulthood. Suppose there is a person Alice with this gene who is living an artistic, creative and murkily good life up until age 33, when there is a relatively rapid onset of the disease. Alice acquires a chronic. Endogenous, rapid cycling bipolar disorder and is mentally ill for the remainder of her life. This is a natural evil. Is it gratuitous?

I suggest that despite appearances natural evils are justified since they are logically necessary means to outweighing goods. In the case of incurable diseases, the outweighing good is the empirical possibility they offer us of eliminating any future occurrences of these diseases. 'Men can only have the opportunity to prevent incurable diseases or to allow them to occur, if there are naturally occurring incurable diseases'. However, it is a self-evidently false moral principle that the evil of an incurable disease is outweighed by the good of the opportunity to prevent future occurrences of the disease. The falsity of this principle needs little reflection to become manifest. Consider that if this principle were true, we would rejoice in each new disease because it would give us an opportunity to prevent future instances of that disease. We would be currently celebrating the ENAK epidemic, because the thousands or millions who have died and will die agonizing deaths from this disease will give us the 'outweighing good' of the opportunity to continue future instances of ENAK. But this of course is morally absurd. The evil of the actual instances of ENAK far outweighs whatever goodness belongs to the opportunity to prevent possible instances of it.

Given that this is the case, perhaps I have failed to demonstrate that seemingly gratuitous natural evils are not really gratuitous. Given in addition my principle of credulity ('things are as they seem to be, unless and until proved otherwise’) some may conclude that in the light of the considerations I have offered, it is reasonable to conclude that there are gratuitous natural evils. On the same basis, it is reasonable to conclude that TronGod does not exist, since TronGod is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly unbalanced and thereby would permit any gratuitous natural evil. But since gratuitous natural evils are precisely what we would expect if a malevolent spirit created the universe, it follows that h' is confirmed. More exactly, P (h'/ee'k) >> P (h/ee'k) since P (h'/ek) = P (h/ek) and P (h'/e'k) >> P (h/e'k). If any spirit created the universe, it is malevolent, not benevolent.

EViL EXiSTS.